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  With the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the federal government explicitly 
endorsed the transfer of exclusive control over government-funded inventions to universities and 
businesses operating with federal contracts. While this legislation was intended to accelerate 
further development and commercialization of the ideas and inventions developed under federal 
contracts, the government did not provide any strategy, process, tools, or resources to shepherd 
innovations from the halls of academia into the commercial market.  And more than twenty-five 
years later, it is clear that few universities have established an overall strategy to foster 
innovation, commercialization, and spillovers.  Multiple pathways for university innovation exist 
and can be codified to provide broader access to innovation, allow a greater volume of deal flow, 
support standardization, and decrease the redundancy of innovation and the cycle time for 
commercialization.  Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) were envisioned as gateways to 
facilitate the flow of innovation but have instead become gatekeepers that in many cases 
constrain the flow of inventions and frustrate faculty, entrepreneurs, and industry. The proposed 
changes focus on creating incentives that will maximize social benefit from the existing 
investments being made in R&D and commercialization on university campuses.   
 1 
Commercializing University Innovations: A Better Way 




  Today we take for granted the rapid pace of technological progress that has 
carried many national economies forward for the past 200 years. Continued innovation 
that has diffused through the marketplace has made this progress possible. In turn, 
entrepreneurs have been instrumental in commercializing innovations, especially the 
radical or breakthrough innovations—such as the automobile, airplane, air conditioner, 
personal computer, among others—that have transformed economies and societies in 
fundamental ways that the more typical incremental innovations associated with large 
corporate enterprises have not (Baumol 2002).  
  As technologies have grown more sophisticated and emerging industries have 
become more high-tech, universities have become more important players in the 
processes of invention, innovation, and commercialization. We have written this paper 
largely because we anticipate universities playing an even more important role in the 
innovation process in the future.  
  To be sure, bringing innovations to market has not been the main historical role of 
university-based researchers. Instead, university researchers quite appropriately 
concentrate on basic science. But the ultimate aim of scientific research, after all, is to 
improve the human condition and so aiding the transfer and commercialization of 
discoveries serves the interests of the inventor and society.  “Since the Industrial 
Revolution, the growth of economies around the world has been driven largely by the 
pursuit of scientific understanding, the application of engineering solutions, and continual 
technological innovation” (National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of 
Engineering 2006). Ideally, university structures should support all aspects of this 
process, from invention to innovation, as well as commercialization.   
  In theory, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was supposed to make commercialization 
easier by clearing the way for universities to claim legal rights to innovations developed 
by their faculty using federal funding. This clearly was a constructive step forward. But 
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with new rights came new layers of administration and often bureaucracies.  Rather than 
implementing broad innovation/commercialization strategies that recognized different 
and appropriate pathways of commercialization, as well as multiple programs and 
initiatives to support each path, many universities  focused on the creation 
of one centralized Technology Transfer Office (or TTO). Often this office was expected 
to be the gatekeeper or protector of university Intellectual Property (IP) or the maximizer 
of revenue streams rather than the grease in the gears that allowed the system to flourish.  
Thus, while many of the university TTOs met their narrow mandate by channeling 
university-generated inventions into generating revenue for the university, the broader 
and more fundamental goal of the original Bayh-Dole Act remains elusive—to maximize 
the potential for university-based inventions to result in commercialized new products 
and innovations. 
  What can be done to better achieve this essential objective? What should be done? 
Our central purpose here is to answer these questions. We begin with a brief background 
of university research, move on to discuss the emergence of technology transfer as a 
university goal, and then describe how technology transfer exists on most campuses 
today.  We believe the current process is sub-optimal, however, and thus offer 
universities several alternative pathways to enhance and accelerate commercialization 
and spillover activities. These alternatives all are predicated on the view that society is 
likely to benefit more if universities seek to maximize the volume and speed of their 
commercialization activities rather than pursue the conventional objective of maximizing 
licensing revenue.   
 
II. Financing of University Research: A Brief Background 
  
  For several decades after World War II, most research and development (R&D) in 
the United States was financed by the federal government, specifically through the 
National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of 
Defense. By 1979, industry R&D expenditures passed government spending, growing 
more than three-fold after controlling for inflation between 1975 and 2000. By 
comparison, while government funded R&D rose quickly after the war, since 1975 it has 
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inched up about 75 percent (National Science Foundation 2006).  Government funded 
R&D has focused, appropriately, more on basic than applied research, while the priorities 
of private R&D spending have been reversed.  
 
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3  about here. 
 
  As Figure 2 shows, industry performance of government funded R&D rose 
quickly from 1955 to the early 1960s, but has since fluctuated significantly.  Conversely, 
universities and colleges have shown a steady acceleration in their R&D performance, 
particularly with basic research.  Today, more than half of basic research is conducted in 
universities (Figure 3). And while much less is spent on basic science than on applied 
science, the absolute dollars of funding going into basic science are a misleading 
indicator of its importance, since basic science stands at the base of our economic 
“pyramid.”  It is breakthroughs in basic science, after all, that have created new 
industries.   
  U.S. institutions of higher learning and their research output appear to be in good 
shape, remaining atop the standard global rankings. But there are several disturbing signs 
beneath the surface: 
  The United States has experienced stagnant to declining levels of industrial R&D 
investments, decreasing industry-university co-authorships, and decreasing 
citations of U.S. science and engineering articles by industry (Rapoport 2006).  
  There is some indication that foreign-sourced R&D is being driven by access to 
foreign universities and that the type of research being performed in developing 
countries is increasingly innovative in nature (Thursby and Thursby 2006).   
  Industry investments in U.S. university-based R&D have stagnated.   
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here.   
 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
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  For forty years, funding from industry to universities steadily rose and now for 
four consecutive years, universities have seen stagnation in industry support at the 
aggregate and micro level.  It is too early to know whether this is a long-term trend, let 
alone the reasons for it, but there is reason for concern.  
  Anecdotally, it appears that relative to some foreign universities, U.S. universities 
are becoming less friendly to collaborations and commercialization. In particular, U.S. 
universities historically have benefited significantly from an inflow of R&D capital from 
U.S. affiliates of foreign companies (particularly European companies). These benefits 
are threatened, however, by a growth in bureaucracy and an increasing (and short-
sighted) emphasis on the part of U.S. universities on securing intellectual property rights 
to inventions by their faculty. If these two trends continue, the flow of R&D funding 
from these U.S. affiliates is likely to slow, if not reverse.  
 
Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7 about here. 
 
  In short, if the U.S. economy is to continue its rapid pace of economic growth, it 
will be necessary not only to adopt innovations from other parts of the world but also to 
make investments in basic research in a setting that supports commercialization, 
spillovers, and general interactions between academic researchers and industry.  In the 
discussion that follows, we will briefly discuss the ways in which universities and 
industry currently interact, paying particular attention to Technology Transfer Offices 
(TTOs) that are now found on many campuses. Outside the TTO setting, universities and 
industry also engage with each other in a host of ways that can be better understood and 
nurtured for the health of both parties. We will discuss the important role that culture 
appears to play on university campuses at the departmental level, and how universities 
must consider more than just their policies toward TTOs if they want to encourage and 
support invention and entrepreneurship.     
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III. The Rise of University Technology Transfer 
 
  When Harry Steenbock demonstrated a means of fortifying Vitamin D in food and 
drugs through a process called irradiation, he became concerned with how the technology 
would be implemented.  Specifically, Steenbock recognized that unqualified individuals 
or organizations could use his invention, and possibly do harm, unless he brought it to 
market with legal protection – that is, a patent.  The University of Wisconsin, where 
Steenbock worked at the time, declined his offer of patent ownership.  Working with 
alumni, Steenbock instead created WARF, a separate entity that was university-affiliated 
and could accept patents, license them out, and disperse revenues back to the inventor 
and the university without exposing the university to potential financial and political 
liability.  And thus, in 1924 the nation’s oldest TTO was conceived (Sampat 2006).  
  It took another fifty years for the confluence of changing federal law, patterns of 
R&D investment, knowledge-intensive emerging industries, shifting focus in regional 
economic development, a growing knowledge of commercialization success stories, and 
declining levels of public support for universities to rapidly accelerate the practice that 
Steenbock helped to establish.    
 
Insert Figure 8 about here.   
 
  By the 1960s and 1970s, formal endorsement of technology transfer from 
federally-funded research was bubbling up on the federal policy agenda.  The Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare; the National Institutes of Health; and the Department 
of Defense began to grant to selected universities the rights to patent inventions resulting 
from their funded research.  But these rights were often negotiated and the seeming 
bureaucracy that this created frustrated many, including then Senator Robert Dole who 
commented “rarely have we witnessed a more hideous example of over management by 
the bureaucracy.”   
  Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 largely to address this problem, and 
to accelerate the commercialization of federally-funded research at universities that 
yielded promising new technologies  When it came into law, Bayh-Dole had the practical 
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effect of standardizing patenting rules for universities and small businesses, something 
that previous conflicting laws had not done.  The federal government was off the hook 
and the universities were given the opportunity and obligation to commercialize 
innovations resulting from federal funding.  Policy makers had endorsed technology 
transfer activities and the last remaining campuses without explicit technology transfer 
functions began to change.  Up to that point, universities had seen public engagement in 
technology transfer as politically and economically risky, and in most cases, irrelevant to 
their core missions.  It was not clear that the public supported closer ties between 
universities and industry.  While the debate on the polluting of science norms, a common 
concern with anti-commercialization critics, was well established and would continue, 
Bayh-Dole seemingly gave universities no choice but to engage in the transfer of 
inventions to the market  (Sampat 2006; Rogers, Yin, and Hoffmann 2000). 
  Other trends or forces that were prevalent or emerging around and after the 
passage of Bayh-Dole helped establish technology transfer as a primary part of many 
university missions (Mowery et al. 2001), at a time when public support for universities 
began to decline (Feller 2004). It is understandable, therefore, that many universities 
began to look to technology transfer – and the offices that were in charge of it, the TTOs 
– as new potential sources of revenue. Indeed, championing commercialization came to 
be viewed almost as a core university activity on some campuses.   
  It should be clear, however, that the development and growing importance of 
TTOs that followed Bayh-Dole were not the stated goals of the legislation. TTOs instead 
were the product of that legislation—more than likely the unintended consequence of the 
act.    
IV. Today’s Technology Transfer “System” 
 
  While there is evidence that some investments made in basic research at 
universities have been successfully commercialized through the technology transfer 
process, there is a plausible if not convincing case to be made that the results could be 
better. Commercialization of university research (whether judged by numbers of patents, 
licensing of revenue, or new companies formed), remains differentially successful and 
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largely concentrated in just a handful of universities (Rogers, Yin, and Hoffmann 2000).  
This is not an outcome one would expect from a nation rich in scientific talent at many 
universities. 
 
Insert Figure 9 about here.   
 
  Ironically, this outcome nonetheless is one product of the prevailing model of 
commercialization activities that took root in the 1980s.  Many universities have used the 
TTO to centralize all their invention and commercialization activities, requiring all 
university faculty members to work through these offices. In addition, many university 
administrations often have rewarded TTO offices and their personnel based on the 
revenues they generate rather than on the volume of the inventions the universities 
commercialize. We label this current system the revenue maximization model of 
technology transfer, even though there is some evidence to suggest that universities 
structure their TTO operations only to maximize revenues in the short term.
1  
We believe that there are several flaws in the revenue maximization model of university 
technology transfer. For one thing, the current reward structure and the centralization that 
accompanies it have turned TTOs into monopoly gatekeepers. Like any monopoly, this 
means that TTOs do not have incentives to maximize “output” – or the actual numbers of 
commercialized innovations – but instead to maximize only revenues earned by the 
university. This, in turn, leads to a “home run” mentality, whereby TTO officers focus 
their limited time and resources on the technologies that appear to promise the biggest, 
fastest payback. Technologies that might have longer-term potential—or that might be 
highly useful for society as a  whole, even if they return little or nothing in the way of 
licensing fees (such as many “research tools” used mainly by other researchers)—tend to 
pile up in the queue, get short shrift, or be overlooked entirely.  
                                                 
1 In considering longer-term financial returns to universities from licensing for cash vs. other forms of 
equity arrangements, at lease one group of researchers has shown equity to outpace cash arrangements 
Michael J. Bray and James N. Lee, "University Revenues from Technology Transfer: Licensing Fees Vs. 
Equity Positions," Journal of Business Venturing 15, no. 5-6 (2000).  Full consideration of the short- vs. 
long-term theoretical effects of different university technology transfer mechanisms remains an area open 
for future research, particularly when societal measures for benefit are taken into consideration in terms of 
diffusion of innovation within the marketplace and other similar issues.    
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  How predominant is the revenue maximization model among TTOs? Markman et 
al. found that the principle mechanism favored by most TTOs was licensing for cash (72 
percent), with licensing for an equity stake and sponsored research less popular at 17 
percent and 11 percent, respectively.  These interview-based findings were confirmed by 
the researchers in a review of TTO mission statements which showed a heavy focus on 
licensing and protection of the university’s intellectual property (Markman et al. 2005b) 
and are consistent with other research in this area (Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby 2001). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
  With revenue maximization as a central goal, it also is not surprising that most 
depictions of technology transfer activities are portrayed as very linear processes in 
which research is performed, inventions are disclosed, technology licenses are executed, 
income is received, and wealth is generated (Siegel et al. 2004). 
 
Insert Figure 10 about here. 
 
  But the process of technology transfer actually is much more complex.  Patenting 
and licensing of research are not the only means—or even the most important means —of 
“transferring” new knowledge from universities to the market.  Universities have a range 
of outputs including information, materials, equipment and instruments, human capital, 
networks, and prototypes (Siegel et al. 2004).  The means by which these outputs are 
diffused, especially to industry, vary across universities (Sampat 2006).  The Carnegie 
Mellon Survey of Industrial R&D found that the most commonly reported mechanisms 
for diffusion of public research to industry were publications, conferences, and informal 
exchanges.  Patents ranked low in most industries except for pharmaceuticals (Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh 2002). Measuring university success in spawning innovation solely by 
licensing or patenting activities, therefore, almost certainly masks the importance of these 
other means of knowledge diffusion.   
  There are other means by which universities diffuse their technologies to the 
market: through non-patent innovations, start-up companies launched by university 
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faculty or related parties, and consulting engagements between industry and faculty. One 
recent study, for example, indicated that approximately 29 percent of patents with public 
university faculty inventors were assigned to firms rather than the university (Thursby 
and Thursby 2005a), which indicates a significant degree of faculty-industry engagement, 
whether formally through TTOs or informally through other pathways (Siegel et al. 
2004).   
  Meanwhile, university faculty members are learning ways to maximize their own 
self-interest within a general environment that impels TTOs to maximize revenue. In 
particular, and not surprisingly, faculty engaged in commercialization activities are 
becoming more competent in the field. One measure of this is the significant increase in 
disclosure rates over time by faculty, perhaps the best indicator of university-based 
technology transfer at the faculty level (Thursby and Thursby 2003).    
 
Insert Figure 11 about here. 
 
  Still, university commercialization activity remains highly concentrated within the 
university itself—seemingly obeying the widely accepted “80/20” rule, with somewhat 
less than 20 percent of university faculty ever having engaged in patent disclosure of any 
kind (Thursby and Thursby 2003). Further, there is a trend toward greater university 
ownership of research and commercialization, reflected in the significant increases in 
university patenting (Coupe 2003), increased contributions to R&D spending,
2 and the 
proliferation of university spin-offs and research parks (Mowery et al. 2004).  University 
spin-offs, in this context, are defined as “firms founded on a contractual agreement, such 
as an option of a license, regarding intellectual property for which the university 
maintains title” (Lowe 2002). Some spin-offs reside in incubators near campuses but this 
is not always the case.    
  Spin-offs pursue paths and opportunities that larger, more established companies 
shun or ignore. Of the inventions licensed in the previous five years, TTOs reported that 
45 percent were at the proof of concept stage, 37 percent were lab scale prototypes, 15 
                                                 
2 In 2000, 19 percent of the R&D performed on university campuses was university funded, up from 10 
percent in 1960 (National Science Foundation 2006).   
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percent were manufacturing-ready technologies, and 12 percent were market-ready 
inventions (Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby 2001).  Another survey of 62 universities 
found that new and small companies tend to license early stage technologies that are 
passed over by large firms (Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby 2001).  With venture capital 
firms moving toward later stage investments (PricewaterhouseCoopers and National 
Venture Capital Association 2007), the role of universities in nurturing early stage start-
ups may be increasing in importance. 
  While spin-offs from universities are few in number, they are disproportionately 
high performing companies, and often serve as a mechanism to bridge the development 
gap between university technology and existing private sector products and services. A 
quick look at the data confirms this point. Although only 3,376 academic spin-off 
companies were created in the United States from 1980 to 2000, fully 68 percent of these 
companies remained operational in 2001 (Association of University Technology 
Managers 2002). One study has estimated that 8 percent of all university spin-offs had 
gone public, 114 times the “going public rate” for U.S. enterprises generally (Goldfarb 
and Henrekson 2003).  As impressive as these figures are, they understate the extent of 
university-based entrepreneurship since they do not include start-up companies 
represented in business plan competitions, back-door entrepreneurial activities emerging 
out of faculty consulting, and general spillovers from graduate students creating 
companies tied to outcomes of university research.   
  One other important measure of technology transfer is the time between discovery 
and commercialization.  Accelerating the pace of commercialization provides more 
benefit to both the university (quicker return to R&D) and the commercializing agent 
(more flexibility with time in terms of testing or bringing to market) (Markman et al. 
2005a). In reviewing the commercialization time of patented protected inventions in 91 
universities, Markman et al (2005a) found that speed had a positive effect on licensing 
income or start-up creation (Markman et al. 2005a). Still, even in this study, the average 
commercialization speed – from discovery to licensing or spin-off – was just over four 
years.   
  We believe there must be a better way of commercializing university inventions. 
Commercialization policies can and must be structured to realize the social benefits of a 
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wider number of innovations. The question is how, and it is to this subject that we next 
turn.  
V. Proposed Models of University Commercialization  
 
  Universities commercialize the innovations developed by their faculty largely by 
licensing the intellectual property in these breakthroughs (typically patents) to 
entrepreneurs, to the faculty members themselves, or to established companies. 
Historically, university faculty and students have generated a range of innovations that 
have found their way into the market and have helped launch new companies.  The 
Internet browser (Netscape), Internet search engine (Google), and various 
biotechnologies (Genentech) are just a few examples (Association of American 
Universities 1998).  There are, however, strong reasons to believe that the objectives of 
Bayh-Dole could be met even more effectively. 
  During the 1980s and 1990s, most universities had little experience negotiating 
with industry and considering commercialization activities.  With time and experience, 
however, universities and, more importantly, faculty have gained expertise in the 
invention and innovation processes.  As individual university cultures and disciplinary 
practices have evolved, some universities have begun to recognize that 
commercialization and innovation activities are larger than what can run through a single 
office and require cross-university programmatic initiatives in the classroom and the 
laboratory.  Examples of universities that have moved in this direction include MIT, the 
University of Arizona, and the University of California, Berkeley.  As these new forms 
emerge, or more accurately, as TTOs become just one component of the innovation and 
commercialization ecosystem, technology transfer will increase in efficiency, volume, 
and quality on most college campuses.   
  In his classic work, Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers delineates two models of 
technology diffusion systems: “Centralized diffusion systems are based on a more linear, 
one-way model of communication.  Decentralized diffusion systems more closely follow 
a convergence model of communication, in which participants create and share 
information with one another in order to reach mutual understanding” (Rogers 2003).  If 
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this distinction is right, and we believe it is, then a change in the practice of innovation 
and commercialization will not be achieved simply by creating a single, central office. 
Instead, technology will be best diffused by recognizing and taking advantage of the 
decentralized nature of innovation and university faculty who participate in this process.  
  It is also important to take account of the importance of work environment and 
culture on entrepreneurial activity among faculty.  The shrinking gap in disclosure and 
other entrepreneurial activities by women, for example, is evidence that incremental 
changes in culture and practice can have important effects (Thursby and Thursby 2005b).  
Bercovitz and Feldman also found strong evidence for the impact of the micro-level work 
environment on faculty patterns of invention disclosure in a study of a group of matched 
faculty at two prominent medical schools.  In this study, disclosure increased when a 
faculty member was at an institution with a tradition of disclosure, observed others in a 
department disclosing, and worked in a department with a chair who actively disclosed. 
The authors also found evidence that the institutional norms where academics completed 
their training influenced future technology transfer proclivity, but they determined that 
individuals ultimately were most likely to alter their activities to conform to local norms 
(Bercovitz and Feldman 2006).   
  Not only do research faculty members appear to have a profound influence on the 
innovation and commercialization of other academic researchers at their universities, but 
also these individuals are the key agents of knowledge transfer (Markman et al. 2005a).  
Many technologies licensed from universities are nascent in their development and much 
of the value in the innovation lies in the tacit knowledge of their inventors (Jensen and 
Thursby 2001).  Faculty members also tend to become more attuned to the potential for 
application and commercialization of their research over time.  Experience with invention 
and commercialization, as well as consulting, advisory board service, industry-sponsored 
research, and formal commercialization activities, allow faculty members to become 
more familiar with the process and affect the direction of their future research (Mansfield 
1995).   
  Given the importance of faculty researchers to innovation and commercialization, 
a university culture that is accepting of entrepreneurial activities is best built from the 
ground up by researchers who promote and connect other colleagues both inside and 
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outside of academe.   But how can universities promote the development of 
entrepreneurial capabilities in their faculty? The answer does not lie, in our view,  in 
expanding the role for TTOs. Many research faculty members are likely to have better 
opportunity recognition skills – both scientific and entrepreneurial – than TTO 
professionals. After all, academic researchers have spent years working in their fields, 
and they have incentives within their disciplines to recognize avenues for scientific 
advances and breakthroughs.  Furthermore, researchers’ “social capital” – their 
professional relationships with their peers inside and outside the academy – give them a 
greater ability to link scientific opportunity recognition to entrepreneurial opportunity 
recognition.   
  To be sure, these opportunity recognition skills – particularly for commercial 
opportunities – take time to develop. One does not expect to achieve cultural 
transformation overnight.  Many university campuses have experienced a gradual cultural 
change since the passage of Bayh-Dole, and they now face the challenge of defining 
multiple pathways to support university innovation and commercialization and redefining 
the role of TTOs. 
  It has been suggested that TTOs should reorganize in ways that would reduce the 
potentially significant “transactions costs” involved in moving scientific discoveries more 
rapidly into the marketplace. These costs include tangible and intangible expenses related 
to the identification, protection, and modification of innovation and commercialization, 
as well as the administrative expenses and the opportunity costs for the time that would 
be required by researchers. To reduce these costs, it has been suggested that TTOs adopt 
something like a “value chain” model (Phan and Siegel 2006) that encourages 
universities to disaggregate their functions, slicing and dicing a range of what are 
considered to be technology transfer functions and assigning them to specialists, while 
leveraging outside organizations and other partners in the process. 
  We build on this basic concept, recognizing both the comparative advantage of 
faculty in opportunity recognition and the limited budgets of university administration.  
In particular, we believe universities must recognize that patenting is only one of many 
pathways from innovation to marketplace. We argue, therefore, for a change in the 
objective of technology commercialization and in the “model” of the commercialization 
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process.  Specifically, we suggest a move from a “licensing model” that seeks to 
maximize patent licensing income to a “volume model” that emphasizes the number of 
university innovations and the speed with which they are moved into the marketplace.  
  In fact, there are multiple volume models, but they share several features:  
  They provide rewards for moving innovations into the marketplace, rather than 
simply counting the revenue they may return;  
  They focus on faculty as the key agents of innovation and commercialization; 
and  
  They emphasize further standardization in the interactions of campuses with their 
faculty and with industry.   
  Below we consider four variations of the “volume” model and discuss their 
advantages and drawbacks. 
 
Free Agency 
   The first volume model is “free agency,” a term we borrow from the sports 
world. Under this approach, faculty members are given the power to choose a third party 
(or themselves) to negotiate license arrangements for entrepreneurial activities, provided 
that they return some portion of their profits to the university.  The TTOs can be one of 
the third parties offering services, but other parties can also compete on a range of 
services and experience offered.   
  The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) is an exemplar of such a 
model.  WARF is independent of the university, and Wisconsin faculty are under no 
obligation to use it except in the case of federal funding.  As a practical matter, however, 
nearly all of them use WARF because the organization has acquired expertise over time 
that is viewed to be valuable. 
  Free agency introduces a strong dose of competition to the university TTO, while 
giving academic researchers the freedom to seek out the best arrangement on the 
speediest terms to commercialize their innovation. This model is best suited for 
innovations in which faculty members have deep commercial expertise and social 
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networks to facilitate commercialization.  One drawback to free agency, however, is that 
university faculty members often lack the resources to pay for patent searches and 
applications, functions now performed by the TTO. This problem might be overcome 
through profit sharing arrangements between researchers and their lawyers or third-party 
commercialization agents. Or faculty members could license their inventions to third 
parties who, as part of the agreement, would bear the patent-related costs.  This free agent 
model requires further consideration in order to determine if it is consistent with existing 
legislation and to evaluate the degree to which regulation to overcome information 
barriers would be necessary.   
 
Regional Alliances 
  A second possible model provides more technology transfer activities via regional 
alliances, provided those alliances operate in ways to maximize volume rather than 
licensing income. Under this approach, multiple universities form consortia that develop 
their mechanisms for commercialization.  Economies of scale allow for lower costs of the 
commercialization functions overall, and the universities are able to share these costs 
among the multiple participants. 
  This model may prove particularly attractive for smaller research universities 
which may not have the volume to support a seasoned and highly able licensing and 
commercialization staff independently.  WARF, through the WiSys Technology 
Foundation, is experimenting with more of a regional approach to transfer and has had 
positive results so far.  This type of hub-and-spoke model is effective when supported by 
experienced staff and dedicated local resources.  
  There are two principal concerns with the regional alliances model, however. 
First, a regional TTO with insufficient resources may try to behave like a “super TTO,” 
seeking to maximize licensing revenue for the consortium as a whole rather than the 
number of commercialization opportunities and the speed with which they are moved out 
the door. In addition, regional models may face coordination challenges or disputes over 
attribution of inventiveness, with one or more university pitted against others when a 
commercial opportunity is realized through the joint work of several researchers at 
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different universities. The probability of disputes is likely related to the amount of money 
at stake.   
 
Internet-based Approaches 
  Closely related to the regional alliance model, Internet-based approaches use the 
web to facilitate commercialization. Given their structure, internet “matchmaking” 
approaches – which seek to match those who have ideas and those who want to 
implement them – are inherently built to maximize volume rather than licensing income. 
  The iBridge Network, a program that was funded by the Kauffman Foundation 
and works with a consortium of universities, is an example of such a model.  Launched in 
January, 2007, iBridge is working to become a Web platform that could support an 
alternative pathway for university innovation. This network has the potential to provide 
research tools, materials and non-exclusive licensed technologies that should accelerate 
university innovation, with low transaction costs.  Its success remains to be seen, but 
initial web traffic suggests that the program has had an auspicious start. 
 
Faculty Loyalty 
  The last –  and perhaps the most radical – model for many universities to consider 
is for universities to give up their intellectual property rights, anticipating instead that 
loyal faculty will donate some of the fruits of their success back to the university.  While 
surrendering rights to faculty may seem drastic, this strategy offers the ultimate incentive 
for the external agents of commercialization to engage in the process.  
  In fact, the United States has a great tradition of philanthropy, and this model 
allows university administration to focus on the core activities of a university while 
securing additional university operational dollars through the virtuous cycle of giving.  
There is a history of successful faculty members donating some of their profits back to 
the university.  Jan T. Vilcek, for example, pledged $105 million to the New York 
University School of Medicine in 2005, largely as the result of royalties earned from 
Remicade®, a drug invented by Dr. Vilcek and a colleague while working at the school’s 
Department of Microbiology (New York University Medical Center 2005). Other 
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examples abound including George Hatsopoulos and MIT (MIT 2005) or Jim Clark and 
Stanford (Stanford University 1999).   
  The obvious downside to the “loyalty” model is the inherent – and significant – 
risk. There is always the possibility that successful academic entrepreneurs will not 
voluntarily share their success with their employers. This risk is even greater for 
universities that have difficult relationships with their faculty.   
  We believe, however, that this risk is worth taking for most universities. 
Academics pursue their work in large part because they have a thirst for knowledge and 
discovery. While they may also be motivated by money, most faculty members are 
determined to move commercially viable innovations to the market.  And as monetarily 
successful professors give back to their universities, they set positive examples for their 
colleagues to follow. Furthermore, the “loyalty” model avoids the haggles associated 
with Intellectual Property (IP) rights and, therefore, would theoretically promote more 
rapid commercialization of inventions than either of the other two models.  And it should 
entail very low risks for well-run universities that promote collegiality.  
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
  “When you ask ‘Where are tomorrow's ideas?’ they are things you and I would 
look at and say, ‘That's not going anywhere. That's worthless.’ ” 
- William R. Brody, president of Johns Hopkins University 
(in Holstein 2006) 
  U.S. universities today are not only competing with other U.S. institutions for 
collaborative relationships with industry.  They are both collaborating and competing 
within a global economy. Our institutions must continue to be leaders in research, the 
advancement of innovation, and the commercialization of our ideas in order to remain 
competitive.   
  The majority of university-industry agreements relate to technologies that are 
many years away from being commercialized (Jensen and Thursby 2001), and 
universities cannot take on the burden of forecasting uncertain commercial returns. This 
function is best performed by the private sector. In the end, society will be best served by 
a knowledge transfer system that encourages interactions between universities and 
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industry but also inspires each party to capitalize on its relative advantage – with 
universities focusing on discovery and entrepreneurs devoting their efforts to 
commercialization.   
  This discussion of how innovations are transferred from universities to industry is 
an important part of the national conversation about U.S. economic competitiveness.  We 
are now at a critical time in which the incentives of some universities (or specific 
officials within the universities) may lead to the codification of a system that would 
inhibit rather than promote commercialization of technological breakthroughs. We have 
argued that the most important way to avoid this outcome is to refocus university 
administration away from the historic “patent-licensing  big hit” model to one or more 
“volume models” that concentrate on the number of and the speed with which university 
innovations are sent out the door and into the marketplace.  These models will include 
open source collaborations, copyright, non-exclusive licensing, and a focus on 
developing the social networks for graduate students and faculty to commercialize all 
types of innovations.   
  The federal government, as the funding source for university-based research, is in 
an ideal position to encourage experimentation with these—and other—alternative 
arrangements.  At a minimum, the government can help educate universities regarding 
the importance of providing a more fluid environment that will allow for more rapid 
commercialization of ideas developed by students and faculty. More ambitiously, 
agencies of the federal government can condition their research grants on university 
demonstrations that they are experimenting with and using multiple pathways to provide 
competition or to advance innovations into the commercial market.   
   19 
References 
Association of American Universities. University Technology Transfer of  Government-
Funded Research has Wide Public Benefits 1998. 
Association of University Technology Managers. AUTM Licensing Survey: FY  2001. 
Northbrook, IL: 2002. 
Baumol, William J. The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth 
Miracle of Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
Bercovitz, Janet and Maryann Feldman. "Academic Entrepreneurs: Organizational 
Change at the Individual Level." working paper, (accessed December 2006). 
Bray, Michael J. and James N. Lee. "University Revenues from Technology Transfer: 
Licensing Fees Vs. Equity Positions." Journal of Business Venturing 15, no. 5-6 
(2000): 385-392. 
Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh. "Links and Impacts: The 
Influence of Public Research on Industrial R&D." Management Science 48, no. 1 
(Jan, 2002): 1.  
Coupe, Tom. "Science is Golden: Academic R&D and University Patents." The Journal 
of Technology Transfer 28, no. 1 (2003): 31-46. 
Feller, Irwin. "Virtuous and Vicious Cycles in the Contributions of Public Research 
Universities to State Economic Development Objectives." Economic Development 
Quarterly 18, no. 2 (May 1, 2004): 138-150. 
Goldfarb, Brent and Magnus Henrekson. "Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Policies 
Towards the Commercialization of University Intellectual Property." Research 
Policy 32, no. 4 (2003): 639-658. 
Holstein, William J. "Putting Bright Ideas to Work Off Campus." New York Times, 
November 5, 2006. 
Jensen, Richard A., Jerry G. Thursby, and Marie C. Thursby. "Disclosure and Licensing 
of University Inventions: `The Best we can do with the s**t we Get to Work with'." 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, no. 9 (2003): 1271-1300. 
Jensen, Richard and Marie Thursby. "Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of 
University Inventions." The American Economic Review 91, no. 1 (Mar., 2001): 240-
259. 
Lowe, Robert. "The Role and Experience of Inventors and Start-Ups in Commercializing 
University Research: Case Studies at the University of California." Carnegie Mellon 
University, 2002. 
   20 
Mansfield, Edwin. "Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources, 
Characteristics, and Financing." Review of Economics & Statistics 77, no. 1 (1995): 
55. 
Markman, Gideon D., Peter T. Gianiodis, Phillip H. Phan, and David B. Balkin. 
"Innovation Speed: Transferring University Technology to Market." Research Policy 
34, no. 7 (2005a): 1058-1075. 
Markman, Gideon D., Phillip H. Phan, David B. Balkin, and Peter T. Gianiodis. 
"Entrepreneurship and University-Based Technology Transfer." Journal of Business 
Venturing 20, no. 2 (2005b): 241-263. 
MIT. Entrepreneur alumnus to bankroll winning thesis idea, 2005. Available from 
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2005/hatsopoulos.html. 
Mowery, David C., Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, and Arvids A. Ziedonis. "The 
Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the 
Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980." Research Policy 30, no. 1 (2001): 99-119. 
Mowery, David C., Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, and Arvids A. Ziedonis. Ivory 
Tower and Industrial Innovation: University-Industry Technology Transfer Before 
and After the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States. Innovation and Technology in the 
World Economy. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Business Books, 2004,  
National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering. Rising Above the 
Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic 
Future. Washington, D.C.: 2006. 
National Science Foundation. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006. 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/toc.htm, 2006a. Accessed February 2007. 
Phan, Phillip H. and Donald Siegel. "The Effectiveness of University Technology 
Transfer: Lessons Learned, Managerial and Policy Implications, and the Road 
Forward." SSRN eLibrary (2006). 
New York University Medical Center. Remicade co-inventor and NYU professor of 
microbiology jan vilcek, M.D., ph.D. pledges $105 million to NYU school of 
medicine, 2005. Available from 
http://www.med.nyu.edu/communications/news/pr_118.html. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and National Venture Capital Association. MoneyTree™ 
survey report. 2007. 
Rapoport, Alan I. Where has the Money Gone?  Declining Industrial Support of 
Academic R&D. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, Directorate for Social, 
Behavioral, and Economic Sciences, 2006 (accessed December 15, 2006). 
Rogers, Everett M. Diffusion of Innovations. 5th ed. New York: Free Press, 2003. 
   21 
Rogers, Everett M., Jing Yin, and Joern Hoffmann. Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Technology Transfer Offices at U.S. Research Universities, Association of 
University Technology Managers, 2000. 
Sampat, Bhaven N. "Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The 
World before and After Bayh-Dole." Research Policy 35, no. 6 (2006): 772-789. 
Siegel, Donald S., David Waldman, L. Atwater, and Albert N. Link. "Toward a Model of 
the Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge from Academicians to Practitioners: 
Qualitative Evidence from the Commercialization of University Technologies." 
Journal of Engineering and Technology Management 21, no. 1-2 (2004): 115-142. 
Stanford University. Entrepreneur jim clark to donate $150 million to Stanford, 1999. 
Available from http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/pr/99/991027Clark.html. 
Thursby, Jerry G., Richard Jensen, and Marie C. Thursby. "Objectives, Characteristics 
and Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities." The 
Journal of Technology Transfer 26, no. 1 (2001): 59-72. 
Thursby, Jerry G. and Marie Thursby. "Where is the New Science in Corporate R&D?" 
Science 314, (December 8, 2006): 1547. 
Thursby, Jerry G. and Marie C. Thursby. Faculty Patent Activity and Assignment 
Patterns. Kansas City, MO: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2005a. 
———. "Gender Patterns of Research and Licensing Activity of Science and 
Engineering Faculty." The Journal of Technology Transfer 30, no. 4 (2005b): 343-
353. 
———. "Patterns of Research and Licensing Activity of Science and Engineering 




   22 




Source: National Science Foundation 2006 
 
   23 
Figure 2 – Research and Development Performance, 1953-2004 
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Figure 4 – Industry Funding of University Research, 1953-2004 
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Table 1 – Relative Factor Importance in Choosing Where to Locate R&D Facilities 
 
Relative Factor Importance 
Factor*  Rank 
University collaboration  1 
Faculty expertise  2 
Cost  3 
Growth  3 
Supporting sales  5 
IP protection  Not important 
Ease of ownership  Not important 
Quality R&D personnel  Not important 
 
 
*Costs of R&D are exclusive of tax breaks and government assistance; growth refers to 
market growth potential in that country, Ease of ownership is the ease of negotiation for 




Source: Thursby and Thursby 2006 
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Source:  AUTM Technology Transfer Data for Two-Year Recurrent Respondents; N=140.
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Table 2 – Technology Transfer Office Mission Statements 
 
 
Primary objectives of the UTTO  Percentage of times appeared  
in mission statement (%) 
Licensing for royalties  78.72 
IP protection/management  75.18 
Facilitate disclosure process  71.63 
Sponsored research and assisting inventors  56.74 
Public good (disseminate 
information/technology 
54.61 
Industry relationships  42.55 
Economic development (region, state)  26.95 
Entrepreneurship and new venture creation  20.57 
N = 128 UTTOs.   
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Source: Rogers, Yin, and Hoffmann 2000 
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 Figure 11 – Trends of Faculty Engagement in Entrepreneurship 
 
Percent disclosing  Ratio 
      
Years Female  Male  Male/Female 
83-85 2.04  3.13  1.53 
84-86 2.18  3.49  1.60 
85-87 2.75  4.60  1.67 
86-88 2.96  5.80  1.96 
87-89 3.08  6.64  2.16 
88-90 3.91  6.82  1.74 
89-91 4.68  7.46  1.59 
8.10  1.50 
91-93 6.63  9.14  1.38 
92-94 7.70  9.81  1.27 
93-95 8.89  10.28  1.16 
94-96 8.62  10.73  1.25 
95-97 9.07  11.23  1.24 
96-98 9.73  11.79  1.21 
97-99 10.58  11.88  1.12 
      
90-92 5.40 
 
Source: Thursby and Thursby 2005b 
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Figure 12 – Research University Characteristics by Date of TTO Adoption 
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